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What is solitary confinement, and what has been constitutional law's
relationship to the practices of holding prisoners in isolation? One answer
comes from Wilkinson v. Austin,1 a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court case discussing
Ohio's super-maximum security ("supermax") prison, which opened in 1998
to hold more than five hundred people.
Writing for the unanimous Court in Wilkinson, Justice Kennedy detailed a
painful litany of conditions.2
[A]lmost every aspect of an inmate's life is controlled and monitored.
Inmates must remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23
hours per day. A light remains on in the cell at all times . . . and an
inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to further
discipline ....
Incarceration [in supermax] is synonymous with extreme isolation. In
contrast to any other Ohio prison ... [the] cells have solid metal doors
with metal strips along their sides and bottoms which prevent
conversation or communication with other inmates. All meals are taken
alone .... Opportunities for visitation are rare .... It is fair to say
[that] inmates are deprived of almost any environmental or sensory
stimuli and of almost all human contact .... [P] lacement ... is for an
indefinite period of time, limited only by an inmate's sentence.'
The specifics were in service of meeting the exacting test that the Court had
crafted about when constitutional law has a role to play in protecting prisoners.
In an earlier case, Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner
could challenge his placement in segregation only if the change worked an
"atypical and significant hardship" which, thereby, infringed a prisoner's
1. 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
2. Id. at 223-24.
3. Id. at 214-15.
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liberty interests and triggered due process obligations under the Fourteenth
Amendment.4
In Wilkinson, the Court concluded that placement in Ohio's supermnax
qualified as a significant hardship, since "almost all human contact [was]
prohibited, even.., conversation.., from cell to cell."' Nonetheless, the Court
held that Ohio's procedures sufficed to buffer against "arbitrary
decisionmaldng.",6 The approved procedures included an in-person hearing
that the prisoner can attend; the provision of a written "brief summary of the
factual basis for the classification;" "a rebuttal opportunity" at two levels of
internal review (each authorized to reject the placement); "a short statement of
reasons;" and another review thirty days after the initial placement.7 The
Wilkinson Court thus required some process but did not discuss whether
subjecting individuals to such conditions was itself constitutionally
impermissible.
Ten years after Wilkinson, Justice Kennedy returned to the topic of solitary
confinement in a 2015 concurrence in Ayala v. Davis.8 Justice Kennedy noted
that Hector Ayala, who had been sentenced to death in 1989, had spent most of
"his more than 25 years in custody in 'administrative segregation' or, as it is
better kmown, solitary confinement."9 If following "the usual pattern," Mr.
Ayala had been held for decades "in a windowless cell no larger than a typical
parking spot for 23 hours a day . . . [and] allowed little or no opportunity for
conversation or interaction with anyone." "
Relying on data collected in the late 199os, Justice Kennedy observed it was
likely that about "25,000 inmates in the United States" were living in such
conditions, "many regardless of their conduct in prison."11 Justice Kennedy
4. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995).
5. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 227.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 224-226.
8. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 22o8 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). That decision rejected
a habeas petitioner's claim that the exclusion of his lawyer from a hearing about racially
prejudiced jury selection violated his constitutional rights.
9. Id.
10. Id.
ni. Id. at 22o8-o9 (citing Entombed: Isolation in the U.S. Federal Prison System, AMNESTY INT'L 2
n.3 (July 2014), http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/anr51o4o2ol4en.pdf [http://
perma.cc/CYD4 -4DPT]). The Amnesty International report relied on the article by Daniel
P. Mears, A Critical Look at Supermax Prisons, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Sept.-Oct. 2005,
which in turn used research from the late 199os. See also Daniel P. Mears, Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Supermax Prisons, URB. INST. 4, app. 74 tbl.i (Mar. 20o6), http://www
.lrban.org/research/plblication/evalnating-effectiveness-snpermax-prisons [http://perma
.cc/AT 7 7-HPZ2] (including a chart borrowed from Roy D. King that identified states in
1997-1998 that had snpermax facilities).
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called for more "public inquiry or interest" in prisons. And in a vivid protest,
he suggested that when imposing a capital sentence, a judge tell such a
defendant that "during the many years you will serve in prison before your
execution, the penal system has a solitary confinement regime that will bring
you to the edge of madness, perhaps to madness itself"2
Justice Kennedy raised the prospect that solitary confinement violated
substantive constitutional rights.13 "[T]he judiciary may be required . . . to
determine whether workable alternative systems for long-term confinement
exist, and, if so, whether a correctional system should be required to adopt
them."' Within a month, Justice Kennedy's distress was echoed by Justice
Breyer, who joined by Justice Ginsburg, condemned the "dehumanizing effect
of solitary confinement;" their dissent in Glossip v. Gross argued the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty.15
When these Justices were writing, the question of the constitutionality of
profound isolation was en route to the Court in a certiorari petition on behalf of
Alfredo Prieto.16 Under Virginia's policy that offenders "sentenced to Death
will be assigned directly to Death Row,"17 Prieto was automatically placed in
conditions that a federal district court judges described as "eerily reminiscent"'i
of those in Wilkinson v. Austin. Prieto argued that Wilkinson required an
12. Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2209.
13. Id. The constitutional predicates include that such confinement violates the Eighth
Amendment by imposing serious harms or denying basic needs to which prison officials
were deliberately indifferent. See Wilson v. Seiter, 5O1 U.S. 294 (1991).
During the past few decades, a few lower courts have declined to hold long-term
isolation unconstitutional, but the law has been shifting since those rulings. Further, given
that Eighth Amendment law is sometimes predicated on the obligation to protect a person's
dignity, see, e.g., Trop v. Dnlles, 356 U.S. 86, 1OO (1958), and given Justice Kennedy's
identification of dignity as central to the substantive meaning of due process and to equal
protection, see, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2o15), challenges to isolation
can be focused on the deprivations of dignity that solitary confinement imposes. See
generally Laura L. Rovner, Dignity and the Eighth Amendment: A New Approach to Challenging
Solitary Confinement (Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law, Worling Paper No. 15-55,
2o15), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-2675228 [http://perma.cc/K73K
-VMQ]. In addition, statutory claims include violations of the Americans with Disability
Act. See Brittany Glidden & Laura Rovner, Requiring the State To Justify Supermax
Confinement for Mentally Ill Prisoners: A Disability Discrimination Approach, 9o DENVER U. L.
REV. 1 (2012).
14. Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 221o.
15. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 (2o15) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Prieto v. Clarke, 2o15 WL 4100302 (2015) (No. 15-31), cert.
dismissed, 2o15 WL 41o5028 (2o15).
17. VA. DEP'T OF CORR. OPERATING PROCEDURE 83o.2(D) (7), 46o.A, CAJA-9 41 (2015).
18. Prieto v. Clarke, 78o F.3d 245, 24
8 (4th Cir. 2o15) (quoting Prieto v. Clarke, No. 12-1199,
2013 WL 6019215, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013), cert. dismissed, 2o15 WL 4 1o5o28 (2o15)).
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individualized determination of the need for such segregation. 19 Over a dissent,
the Fourth Circuit rejected that claim: Imprisonment in conditions that the
trial court had found to be "dehumanizing" and "undeniably severe" did not
rise to a constitutional violation.' Former corrections officials and mental
health professionals urged the Court to take up the question and detailed the
harms of isolation and the alternatives available.21 But the petition became
moot when, on October 1, 2015, Virginia executed Mr. Prieto.'
Such potential for developments in the law on isolation cannot be
understood in isolation, for the legitimacy and legality of solitary confinement
is under siege in several quarters. The source of the growing distress comes in
part from the chilling description provided in Wilkinson, written as the post-
9/11 detention of hundreds of people at Guantinamo Bay made visible the
starkness of totalizing control. Detainees there and prisoners in California's
supermax at Pelican Bay mounted protests, including hunger strikes.3 By 2010,
the ACLU's National Prison Project had launched its "Stop Solitary" campaign,
producing reports of horrific conditions for thousands of prisoners held in
Texas and in "the box" in New York State.' As suicides and violence brought
media attention to the suffering and deaths,5 the Vera Institute worked with
prison officials to create alternatives.6
ig. Prieto, 2015 WL 4100302, at *2.
20. Id. at 254-55. Judge Wynn, dissenting, rejected the view that "Prieto's automatic, permanent,
and unreviewable placement" was constitutional. Id. at 255-56.
21. See Brief ofAmici Curiae Corrections Experts in Support of Petitioner, Prieto v. Clare, 2015
WL 4720277, at *7 (2015) (No. 15-31); Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Practitioners of
Psychiatry and Psychology in Support of Petitioner, Prieto v. Clarke, 2015 WL 4720278
(2015) (No. 15-31).
22. Prieto, 2015 WL 4105028 (dismissing the petition for certiorari); see also Associated Press,
Appeals Exhausted, Alfredo Prieto, Serial Killer, Is Executed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://
WWW.nytimes.con!201/10/02/uS/appeals-exhausted-alfredo-prieto-serial-ller-is-executed
.html [http://perma.cc/4VEB-FNZ6].
23. See Neil A. Lewis, Guantdnamo Prisoners Go on Hunger Strike, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2o5/09/ i8/Politics/guantanamo-prisoners-go-on-hunger-strike
.html [http://perma.cc/BY70,QZ56U]; Ian Lovett, Hunger Strike by Inmates Is Latest Challenge
to California's Prison System, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2oll/o7/o8
/us/o8hunger.html [http://perma.cc/6PDJ-J6YJ].
24. See Bure Butler, Matthew Simpson & Rebecca L. Robertson, A Solitary Failure: The Waste,
Cost and Harm of Solitary Confinement in Texas, ACLU TEXAS (2015),
http://www.aclutx.org/2oi/o2/o5/a-solitary-failure [http://perma.cc/2LMB-BM9 9 ];
Scarlet Kim, Taylor Pendergrass & Helen Zelon, Boxed In: The True Cost of Extreme Isolation
in New York's Prisons, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2012), http://www.nyclu.org/files
/publications/nyclu boxedin FJNAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/T2G9 -PEXY].
25. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, More Than a Decade After Release, They All Come Back,
USA TODAY (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.usatoday.comstory/news/nation/2015/1l/04
/solitary-confinement-prisoners-impact7383o286 [http://perma.cc/G9AS-RMsV]; Michael
Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island for 3 Years Without
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The Supreme Court has not yet faced Justice Kennedy's substantive
constitutional question, and lower courts have rejected some claims by
individuals held for decades in isolation.27 Yet a few courts have concluded that
placement of seriously mentally ill individuals in isolation is unconstitutional. 8
Further, within the past two years, courts have approved settlements in class
actions in Arizona, California, and Pennsylvania, each focusing on subsets of
detainees such as the seriously mentally ill, juveniles, or individuals with
disabilities, and specifying the predicates to and limits on the use of isolation.29
Legislators have likewise weighed in. In some states, including Colorado
and Massachusetts, have imposed limits on isolation for the mentally ill.3" On
the federal level, Senators Chuck Grassley, Richard Durbin, John Cornyn,
Sheldon Whitehouse, Mike Lee, Chuck Schumer, Lindsey Graham, Patrick
Leahy, and Corey Booker have joined forces to co-sponsor new legislation, a
Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act, proposing a sharp curtailment of
isolation for the few juveniles in the federal system.31
The developments in the United States need also to be placed in a
transnational context. In the spring of 2015, proposed U.N. provisions (aptly
styled the Mandela Rules and drafted with input from U.S. correctional
leaders) defined confinement of prisoners for twenty-two hours or more per
day for a period exceeding fifteen days to be "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment.'"3 2 The rules call for banning isolation of vulnerable prisoners,
Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TimEs (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o1/o6/o9
/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rlkers-island-for-3-years-without-trial-conmmits-suicide
.html [http://perma.cc/475A-1KXY6]; Erica Goode, Solitary Confinement: Punished for
Lift, N.Y. TimEs (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o15/o8/o4/health/solitary
-confinement-mental-ilness.html [http://perma.cc/WFZ4 -DsTT ].
26. Alison Shames, Jessa Wilcox & Ram Subramanian, Solitary Confinement: Common
Misconceptions and Emerging Safe Alternatives, VERA INST. JUST. (May 2015),
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/solitary-confmement-
misconceptions-safe-alternatives-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/U8T7-B9MB ] .
27. See, e.g., Silverstein v. Bureau of Prisons, 559 F. App'x 739 (toth Cir. 2014).
28. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Jones'E1 v. Berge, 164 F. Supp.
2d 1O96 (W.D. Wis. 2001). See generally Elizabeth Alexander, "This Experiment, So Fatal":
Some Initial Thoughts on Strategic Choices in the Campaign Against Solitary Confinement, s U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2015).
29. Stipulation, Parsons v. Ryan, No. CV 12-oo6o1-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz. Oct. 14, 2014), ECF No.
1185; Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Gov. of Cal., No. C 09-05796 CW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1,
2015), ECF No. 424-2; Settlement Agreement, Disability Rights Network of Pa. v. Wetzel,
No. 1:13-cv-oo6535-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2015), ECF No. 59.
30. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-113.8(1) (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 127
3 9A(b) (West 2015).
31. S. 2123, ll 4 th Cong. § 212 (2015).
32. U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Mandela Rules),
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm. on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 2 4th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.i 5/ 2O5/L.6/Rev.i (May 21, 2015), http://www.unodc.org/documents
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limiting isolation's use to exceptional circumstances, and ensuring visiting
opportunities for those in isolation.33
Yet to look only at pressures from outside prisons is to miss the action
within. During the last few years, directors of several state prison systems
revamped their policies to constrain the use of isolation.' Their national
organization, the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA)-
whose members are the directors of state and federal prison systems-
chartered a special committee on the topic and adopted best practices.3" In the
fall of 2015, ASCA issued a statement that prolonged isolation represents a
"grave problem" and called for its reduction or elimination. 6 In January of
2016, the American Correctional Association will hold hearings on its new
proposed standards for "restricted housing" that, likewise, reflect prison
leaders efforts to set limits on the use of isolation.
To know if this sense of urgency and the many cris de coeur from across the
political spectrum will have a transformative effect requires a baseline. The
questions are whether the "usual pattern" that Justice Kennedy described
(placement in windowless parking-lot size cells for twenty-three hour days) are
commonplace; how many people live under such conditions; the criteria for
entry and exit; and whether the degrees of isolation vary. Answers come from
two reports, Administrative Segregation, Degrees of Isolation, and Incarceration: A
National Overview of State and Federal Correctional Policies, published in 2013, 37
/commissions/CCPCJ/CCPCJ Sessions/CCPCJ 24/resolutions/L6 Revi/ECNI52oI 5 L6Re
vi C V15o3585.pdf [http://perma.cc/VTVs-DFT9 ].
33. Id.
34. See Erica Goode, After 2o Hours in Solitary, Colorado's Prisons Chief Wins Praise, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/o4/o3/i 6/us/after-2o-hours-in-solitary
-colorados-prisons-chief-wins-praise.htil [http://perma.cc/X3 9 2-SQ6T]  (reporting
Colorado's change to "sending inmates to solitary confinement for specific lengths of time
instead of indefinite periods"); Timothy Williams, Prison Officials Join Movement To Curb
Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o25/09/03
/us/prison-directors-group-calls-for-liniting-solitary-confinement.html [http://perma.cc
/ 3NKH-YVUC] (describing Washington's success in "reduc[ing] the number of inmates in
restrictive housing by developing special placement programs for the mentally ill and by
launching a 16-week training program for guards").
35. Policy: Resolutions, Legislation & Legal Issues: Administrative Segregation Sub-Committee, ASS'N
ST. CORRECTIONAL ADMINS. (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.asca.net/projects/i6/pages/203
[http://perma.cc/QC6N-SY9 6].
36. Press Release, Ass'n of State Corr. Admin., New Report on Prisoners in Administrative
Segregation Prepared by the Association of State Correctional Administrators and the
Arthur Liman Public Interest Program at Yale Law School (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www
.asca.net/systenassets/attachments/8895/ASCAo2oLIMAN%2oPress%2oReleaseo2o8-28
-15.pdf?P44222595 [http://perma.cc/V8TF-BRCG].
37. Hope Metcalf, Jamelia Morgan, Samuel Oliker-Friedland, Judith Resnik, Julie Spiegel,
Haran Tae, Alyssa Roxanne Work & Brian Holbrook, Administrative Segregation, Degrees of
Isolation, and Incarceration: A National Overview of State and Federal Correctional Policies (Yale
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and Time-In-Cell: The ASCA-Liman 2014 National Survey of Administrative
Segregation in Prison, released in the fall of 2015, both of which were based on
research jointly sponsored by ASCA and Yale Law School's Liman Project."
The goals of the reports were to create a shared understanding of isolation
and to enable cross -jurisdictional comparisons on rules and practices. The
challenges of doing so came from the array of terms and rules governing what
is variously called "administrative confinement," "administrative segregation,"
"close supervision," "behavior modification," "departmental segregation,"
"enhanced supervision housing" (ESH), "inmate segregation," "intensive
management," "special management unit" (SMU), "security (or special)
housing units" (SHU), "security control," and "maximum control units." Such
placements are predicated on one of three reasons - discipline, protection, or
generic fears that a prisoner will cause harm.
Given this array, we -Liman and ASCA-began by focusing on a subset of
the governing rules; in 2012 we asked directors of state and federal corrections
systems, to provide their policies on "administrative segregation," defined as
removing a prisoner from general population to spend twenty-two to twenty-
three hours a day in a cell for thirty days or more. The resulting 2013 Report,
based on responses from forty-seven jurisdictions, taught us that at the formal
level of policies, getting into segregation was relatively easy, but few policies
focused on getting people out.
The criteria for entry were broad. Many jurisdictions permitted moving a
prisoner into segregation if that prisoner posed "a threat" to institutional safety
or a danger to "self, staff, or other inmates.'9 Constraints on decision-making
were minimal; the kind of notice provided and what constituted a "hearing"
varied substantially.40 The hopes expressed in 2005 in Wilkinson v. Austin-
that minimal due process safeguards would suffice to buffer against
arbitrariness -did not appear to be reflected in the policies, which invested
prison officials with enormous discretion.
Law Sch., Pub. Law Worldng Paper No. 301, 2013) [hereinafter Liman Administrative
Segregation Policies 2013 Report], http://ssrn.com/abstract-2286861 [http://perma.cc/DBU3
-P4 8H].
38. Sarah Baumgartel, Corey Guilmette, Johanna Kalb, Diana Li, Josh Nuni, Devon E. Porter &
Judith Resnik, Time-In-Cell: The ASCA-Liman 2014 National Survey of Administrative
Segregation in Prison (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Worling Paper No. 552, 2015) [hereinafter
ASCA-Liman Time-In-Cell 2014], http: ssrn.con/abstract 2655627 [http://perma.cc/QgX
-RLSN]. The Liman Project is part of the Arthur Liman Program at Yale Law School. See
Arthur Liman Public Interest Program, YALE LAw SCH., http://www.law.yale.ed/centers
-workshops/arthnr-liman-pnblic-interest-program [http://perma.cc/J7SC-H5ZU].
39. ASCA-Liman Time-In-Cell 2014, supra note 38, at 4-5; see also 2013 Liman Administrative
Segregation Policies 2013 Report, supra note 37, at 5-11.
40. ASCA-Liman Time-In-Cell 2014, supra note 38, at 4-5; see also Liman Administrative
Segregation Policies 2013 Report, supra note 37, at 11-13.
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In 2014, the Liman Program and ASCA took the next step by asking prison
directors more than 13o questions -this time about the people in restricted
housing and the conditions in which they lived. Responses came from forty-six
jurisdictions (albeit not all jurisdictions answered all the questions). The
result- Time-In-Cell- offers a unique interjurisdictional window into
segregation. We summarize some of its findings below.
A basic question is the number of prisoners in isolation. In the 2015 Ayala
concurrence, Justice Kennedy cited the figure of 25,000 by relying on research
about supermax facilities from the late 199os. But we tallied 66,ooo prisoners
in thirty-four jurisdictions in restricted housing in 2014, and those prison
systems housed about 73% of the 1.5 million people incarcerated in U.S.
prisons. Extrapolating, an estimated 8o,ooo to loo,ooo people were in such
segregation in 2014, or about one in every six or seven prisoners. And neither
the reports from the 199os nor ours included people in local jails, juvenile
facilities, or in military and immigration detention.
Time-In-Cell also focused on conditions in administrative segregation.
While the numbers of people are much higher than the figure Justice Kennedy
mentioned in Ayala, the pictures he painted in 2005 and in 2015 are not out-of-
date but mirror prisoners' current experiences. The cells are small, ranging
from 45 to 128 square feet, sometimes for two people. In the majority of
jurisdictions, prisoners spend twenty-three hours in their cells on weekdays
and forty-eight hours straight on weekends. In many of the systems reporting,
blacks and Hispanics were over-represented in isolation, when compared to the
prison population in general.
Opportunities for social contact, such as out-of-cell time for exercise, visits,
and programs, are limited, ranging from three to seven hours a week in many
jurisdictions. Phone calls and social visits could be as infrequent as once per
month; a few jurisdictions provided more opportunities. The reminder is that
what we could chronicle was the potential for social contact and activities. But
in most jurisdictions, prisoners' access to social contact, programs, exercise, as
well as what prisoners were allowed to keep in their cells could be limited as
sanctions for misbehavior.
Administrative segregation generally had no fixed endpoint. Further,
several systems did not keep track of the numbers of continuous days that a
person remained in isolation, and in the twenty-four jurisdictions reporting on
this question, a substantial number indicated that prisoners were in
segregation for more than three years. As to release and reentry, in thirty
jurisdictions tracking the numbers in 2013, a total of 4,400 prisoners went
directly from the isolation of administrative segregation to release in the
community.
Unsurprisingly, the running of administrative segregation units posed
many challenges for prison systems, and the problems - coupled with the
surge of concerns - have created incentives for change. Some jurisdictions
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required staff to have additional training and offered flexible schedules,
rotations, or provided extra benefits for the assignment. Further, prison
directors also cited prisoner and staff wellbeing, pending lawsuits, and costs as
reasons to revise their rules. A few directors added that change was important
because it "is the right thing to do."
As noted, the ASCA-Liman Report relies on answers from those who run
prisons. In the fall of 2015, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) released a
survey drawn from another source -prisoners.4 Based on responses during
2011-2012 from 91,177 inmates in 233 state and federal prisons and in 357 jails,
BJS found that almost 20 percent of those detainees had been held in restricted
housing within the prior year.' The individuals more likely to have been
placed in restricted housing were younger, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or mentally
ill, and without a high school diploma.43 The BJS study found that expansive
use of restrictive housing correlated with institutional disorder, such as gang
activity and fighting, rather than with calmer environments.4
Time-In-Cell provides both a window into the pervasive use of isolation
and a baseline from which to assess whether the many efforts to limit isolation
will have an impact. The practices of isolation have become entrenched in the
past forty years; unraveling them will require intensive work. The twin
questions on the ground are whether the number of persons held in such
settings is diminishing and whether the conditions in which they live are less
isolating. And coupled with Wilkinson, Ayala, and Prieto, Time-In-Cell should
prompt inquiry into why this form of confinement has not already been
understood to be unconstitutional.
Judith Resnik is the Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Sarah Baumgartel is the Senior
Liman Fellow in Residence, and Johanna Kalb is a Visiting Associate Professor of
Law and the Director of the Liman Program at Yale Law School. All rights reserved.
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Rick Raemisch, and Bernie Warner of ASCA; to Denny Curtis, David Fathi, and
Hope Metcalf; and to the many other people in and outside prisons working to change
conditions of confinement.
41. Allen J. Beck, Use of Restrictive Housing in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 2011-12, BUREAU JUST. STAT.
(Oct. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/urhuspjlll2.pdf [http://perma.cc/4V2B
-YB64].
42. Id. at 1.
43. Id. at 1 & fig.1.
44. Id. at lo.
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